Frequent bureaucratic transfers in India result in concealed expenses, as described by Pradeep S. Mehta in his analysis of governance shifts.
In a concerning development, several Indian states are falling short in implementing minimum fixed tenures for civil service officers, as per formal rules and Supreme Court directives. This inadequate implementation is leading to a culture of frequent transfers, which adversely affects governance, institutional memory, and bureaucratic efficiency.
The IAS (Cadre) Rules were amended in 2014 to mandate a minimum two-year tenure per posting and to require the formation of Civil Services Boards (CSBs) at both central and state levels. However, the reality on the ground is far from ideal. Many states have not yet established functioning CSBs, and the norm of "musical chairs" persists despite formal rules.
Political interference and apathy are key factors contributing to this poor implementation. Frequent reshuffles often occur due to political motivations rather than administrative needs, leading to a culture where officers are transferred before they can stabilize their departments or complete projects. Without enforcement mechanisms and accountability for arbitrary transfers, the norm of frequent transfers continues.
In addition, inadequate institutional support is another significant issue. While the rules mandate CSBs to review early transfers, many states have either not set them up or they remain ineffective, thus failing to uphold the minimum tenure norms.
The situation is further exacerbated by systemic challenges beyond tenure. Other reforms related to fixed tenures, such as proposals for a fixed 35-year service period regardless of entry age to promote merit and social justice, have been recommended by commissions like the Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), but lack full implementation.
The consequences of this situation are severe. Officers repeatedly moved before making a meaningful impact are reduced to being glorified couriers rather than genuine policy implementers. When postings become tools of patronage and transfers are wielded as political punishment, administrative competence and public trust may be lost. The arbitrary transfers of senior IAS officers are corroding the Indian bureaucracy, traditionally described as the "steel frame" of governance.
However, there are some positive examples. Kerala and Maharashtra are highlighted as states that have managed to institutionalise more stable administrative practices. Kerala averages 2.7 years for tenures in district postings, while Maharashtra records higher average tenures due to internal transfer protocols and a less politicised administrative culture.
To reverse this trend, reforms are necessary to move from paper to practice. Tenure-tracking dashboards must be developed at the state level to monitor average durations of service by department, role, and district in real time. Transfer orders, especially those issued within the two-year threshold, should be published online with written justifications for transparency.
There must be formal penalties or institutional checks for politically motivated or arbitrary reshuffling, such as through audit reports, legislative review, or judicial oversight. The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) issued an interim order in 2023 restraining the Kerala government from making arbitrary transfers without consulting the Civil Services Board.
In conclusion, while legal and institutional frameworks advocating for minimum fixed tenures exist, actual implementation is poor due to political interference, lack of functioning oversight bodies like CSBs, and weak enforcement. To ensure administrative stability and efficiency, it is crucial for states to operationalize and empower Civil Services Boards to become the default authority on transfers.
The lack of functioning Civil Services Boards (CSBs) in many Indian states, due to political interference and apathy, is hindering the implementation of the 2014 IAS (Cadre) Rules that mandate a minimum two-year tenure per posting. This, in turn, contributes to a culture where officers are transferred before they can make a meaningful impact, which negatively impacts both bureaucratic efficiency and public trust.
Politicians frequently resort to arbitrary transfers as a tool of patronage or political punishment, undermining the traditional role of the Indian bureaucracy as the "steel frame" of governance. To address this issue, states need to develop tenure-tracking dashboards, publish transfer orders with justifications online, and enforce formal penalties for politically motivated or arbitrary reshuffling through the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) or other oversight bodies.
